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The idea that language shapes thought is inevitably associated with the work 
of Benjamin Lee Whorf. That great American scholar proposed that the categories 
and distinctions characteristic of a given language determine the way its speakers 
both think and act. Accordingly, since languages differ from one another in every 
possible  respect,  Whorf  (1956)  believed  that  their  respective  speakers  tend  to 
differ in how they perceive objectively analogous situations. This general question 
of whether it is language that determines human concepts and perception of the 
world, or whether it is the world that determines the shape of human language has 
been  answered  differently  throughout  history  of  linguistic  and  philosophical 
thought. In what follows – given the limited space of this paper – only the most 
recent approaches to such questions will be outlined.  
Some practitioners of linguistic science have assumed the former position 
(e.g.,  Slobin  1996;  Gentner  and  Imai  1997;  Davidoff,  Davies  and  Roberson 
1999; Boroditsky 2001), whereas others have produced substantial evidence to 
the latter standpoint (e.g. Rosch 1972 or Li and Gleitman 2002, to name but a 
few researchers in human cognition). In most general terms, the authors of this 
paper subscribe to the latter point of view, an insightful summary of which can 
be found in the following words by Blank (2001): 
It seems [...] clear that any kind of Platonian realism in linguistics is doomed to failure and 
that speech communities create their own conceptual systems, or in other words: a “world” of 
their own, which is then subsequently verbalized. This is to say that concepts are neither universal 
nor  are  they  really  language-specific:  they  rather  are  culture-specific  and  thus  extralinguistic 
phenomena (Blank 2001:8).  
Note that this foregoing observation is in line with the proposition upheld by 
the adherents to cognitive linguistics, which considers language as one of the 
many existing forms of human cognitive phenomena, by no means different to 62
others. Since humans conceptualize the world, physical entities and the totality 
of  their  experiences  in  terms  of  categories,  the  same  conceptualization  and 
categorization  processes  must  be  relevant  to  language  (Langacker  1977).
1
Language  may  be  considered  to  be  conceptually-based,  whereas its structure 
depends  on  the  sets  of  interrelated  categories  encompassing  the  so-called 
prototypes, that is typical members of a given category (Rosch 1973),
2 rooted in 
human experience and perception of the world.
3
According to Langacker (1995:106), the elementary mode of operation of 
language  is  concerned  with  allowing  conceptualizations  to  be  symbolized  by 
phonological  sequences  for  purposes  of  thought  and  speech.  Fundamental 
cognitive abilities allow speakers to abstract and store language data in schemas 
(schematization), and to establish relationships between these schemas and the 
structures  from  which  they  are  abstracted  (categorization)  or  the  structures 
which will be constructed or evaluated using these schemas.
4 Thus, cognitive 
linguists [...] refer to a set of fundamental concepts relative to the world of 
perception,  imagination  and  action,  concepts  which  they  consider  to  be  the 
“universals”  of  interconnected  cognitive  systems  (Albertazzi  2000:11).
5  The 
verity of the aforesaid cognitive claim, allowing for the fact that: 
[…] the so-called “language faculty” is just a reflection, in some cases a specialization, of 
general-purpose cognitive abilities, and is governed by general neural processes. […] there is a 
continuum  between all sorts of cognition (especially body-based cognition, but also cognition 
acquired on the basis of social and cultural experience) and language, there being little ground 
for claiming that language, let alone syntax, is a separate “module” in the mind or in the brain
(Barcelona 2000:2).
is not only observable in grammar (Langacker),
6 syntax (e.g. Jackendoff 1991), 
or morphology (e.g. Taylor 2003), but especially semantics, including diachronic 
semantics.  
The application of the cognitive apparatus to semantics is a real milestone, 
as from the perspective of cognitive linguistics words do not possess meanings 
in themselves, but their understanding depends on the fact that they represent 
conceptual categories. As these categories – in the light of what has already been 
mentioned  –  involve  the  element  of  encyclopaedic  information,  the  meaning 
always depends on the context, in particular the extralinguistic context, so the 
1 See also Langacker (1987, 1990, 1991, 1995, 1999).
2 See also Labov (1973), Rosch (1975, 1976, 1977, 1978) and Geeraerts (1997). 
3 This is true to such an extent, that even the technical term referring to how such categories 
are structured is family resemblance, the concept of which is based on everyday experience.  
4  For  a  detailed  discussion,  see  e.g.  Lakoff  and  Johnson  (1980);  Lakoff  (1987,  1993); 
Langacker (as in footnote 
1 above); Croft and Cruse (2004). 
5 Cf. Jackendoff (1992). 
6 See Langacker’s publications listed in footnote 
1 above. 63
traditional  differentiation  between  semantics  and  pragmatics  is  no  longer 
relevant. In Langacker’s own words:  
The  distinction  between  semantics  and  pragmatics  (or  between  linguistic  knowledge  and 
extralinguistic  knowledge)  is  largely  artefactual,  and  the  only  viable  conception  of  linguistic 
semantics is one that avoids such false dichotomies and is consequently encyclopaedic in nature 
(Langacker 1987:154).  
Thus, contrary to the traditional concept of word meaning, where a clear-cut 
line of distinction was drawn between denotative and pragmatic meanings, word 
meaning  is  rather  generated  by  drawing  from  the  repository  of  our 
encyclopaedic – mostly extralinguistic – knowledge, which may be referred to as
the  meaning  potential  (Allwood  2003)  or  purport  of  a  given  lexical  item 
(Cruse 2000; Croft and Cruse 2004). 
Apart from Langacker’s postulate of the encyclopaedic nature of meaning, 
there have been numerous ground-breaking theories concerned with semantics, 
such  as  the  prototype  theory  (Rosch  1973),  the  frame  semantics  theory 
(Fillmore 1975, 1977, 1985), Lakoff’s theory of idealized cognitive models 
or  ICM’s  (1987),  the  image  schema  theory  (Johnson  1987),  the  mental 
spaces  theory  (Fauconnier  1985,  1997)  or  the  conceptual  blending theory 
(Grady, Oakley and Coulson 1999; Fauconnier and Turner 2002), which will 
not be discussed here.
7 Nevertheless, what they have in common is that all of 
them  stress  the  importance  of  the  observation  that  language  is  not  an 
autonomous cognitive faculty (Croft and Cruse 2004) and that – consequently 
–  there  is  no  clear-cut  distinction  between  linguistic  and  extralinguistic 
knowledge.  
The relevance of human cognitive faculties and perception of the world to 
the  study of semantics was observed not only from the synchronic, but also 
diachronic point of view, which has exerted a dramatic influence on the studies 
of diachronic semantic change (cf. Sweetser 1990; Geeraerts 1983, 1997, 2000, 
2002;  Traugott  and  Dasher  2002;  Kleparski  1997,  2000,  2004;  Koch  2004; 
Grygiel 2005 and Kiełtyka 2006). 
A  very  insightful  comment  on  the  importance  of  the  application  of  the 
cognitive  linguistic  apparatus  to  the  study  of  the  diachronic  semantic 
innovations was made by Geeraerts and Grondelaers (1995) to the effect that:  
 […] one of the major steps forward taken by Cognitive Semantics has been to put the study 
of  meaning  back  into  its  cultural  and  experiential  context,  [although]  it would seem that the 
natural consequence of including the diachronic dimension into the investigation has perhaps not 
yet been fully appreciated.  
7 For further details of how the cognitive linguistic approach influences semantic studies see 
also e.g. Reddy (1979); Cruse (2000); Geeraerts (2001); Jackendoff (2002); Taylor (2003); Tyler 
and Evans (2003) or Evans and Tyler (2004). 64
Besides  facilitating  the  discussion  of  the  mechanisms,  regularities  or 
directionality  of  historical  semantic  change,  the  application  of  the  cognitive 
linguistic approach offers an interesting insight into the motivation for semantic 
developments  and  extralinguistic  of  this  problem  in  particular.  Notice  that 
although  the  subdivision  into  linguistic  (or  language-internal)  and 
extralinguistic  (or  language-external)  causes  of  semantic  change  was 
formulated as early as the turn of the 20
th century (Meillet 1905:74–75),
8 it is 
only  nearly  a  century  later,  with  the  advent  of  the  cognitive  approach,  that 
important new developments in this respect can be made: now that cognitive 
linguists  –  especially  adherents  to  conceptual  semantics  –  profess  that  the 
domain of linguistic semantics should be perceived as continuous with human 
conceptualization  as  a  whole  (Jackendoff  2002:282).  Consequently,  the 
contribution of cognitive linguistics to the studies of semantic change can hardly 
be  overestimated.  Numerous  phenomena,  such  as  metaphor,  metonymy, 
hyperbole or synecdoche, which had previously been associated only with the 
literary  and  stylistic  analyses  of  poetic  and  figurative  language,  have  been 
proved  to  be  cognitively-grounded  mechanisms  of  meaning  construction  and 
change (e.g. Sweetser 1990).
It  is  symptomatic  that  even  such  seminal  classics,  as  Ullmann  (1959)  – 
lacking a cognitive insight – considered metaphor and metonymy only as one of 
the  phenomena  included  in  his  functional  classification  of  semantic  change 
processes, founded on the binary oppositions he discerned between: broadening 
(i.e. generalization) vs. narrowing (i.e. specialization) of meaning; amelioration 
(i.e.  elevation)  vs.  pejoration  (i.e.  deterioration);  metaphorical  change  vs. 
metonymic change.
9
Consequently, we believe that apart from the extralinguistic motivations for 
semantic change which have been traditionally perceived as such, it is worth 
pointing to another group of language-external motivations, which result not as 
much from the surrounding extralinguistic reality, as from language-external 
mechanisms of human perception and cognition. 
As regards traditional extralinguistic motivation, the following aspects 
may be listed: politics and war; social-economic reality (including legal systems, 
social taboos etc.); technological and civilizational progress; culture (material 
8 More precisely, Meillet (1905) enumerated three causes of change of meaning: linguistic 
reasons, historical reasons and the reasons related to social stratification. Furthermore, it is worth 
emphasizing that half a century before the aforesaid subdivision made by Meillet (1905), changes 
of  meaning  due  to  political,  commercial  and  religious  factors  (i.e.  extralinguistic  ones)  were 
documented and studied by Trench (1994[1851]). 
9  Thus,  different  angles  of  recent  criticism  directed  at  Ullmann  (1959)  have  shared  the 
common accusation of providing no explanation for the motivation of change and focusing merely 
on the results of a process of change (e.g. Kleparski 1988; Blank 1997; Geeraerts 1997; Traugott 
and Dasher 2002). 65
and non-material) and religion; lastly, there are psychological factors (including 
taboo, euphemism, hyperbola, litotes, synaesthesia), also largely dependent on 
the culture-specific and/or idiosyncratic context. These areas, regardless of how 
specific their classification might be,
10 are the most obvious candidates to be 
analysed for an extralinguistic potential to motivate semantic developments of 
words, as they seem prone to continual change over time, whereas – obviously 
enough – extralinguistic changes do not necessarily lead to new words (Lipka 
1999). Let us consider the following examples: 
Politics and war 
Politics and war have always been one of the most unavoidable and potent 
aspects of the surrounding reality to motivate semantic developments. In this 
respect,  the  former  Soviet  domination  over  many  European  countries  was  a 
notorious source of numerous examples of semantic shifts, partly as a result of 
deliberate efforts of official propaganda, and partly as a result of these efforts 
backfiring due to the bitter contrast with the reality they referred to. Typical 
examples of such a motivation are represented by the semantic alterations that 
have  taken  place  in  Polish  sprawiedliwo"$  społeczna  (social  justice)  and 
demokracja  ludowa  (people’s  democracy).  Although  the  Polish  adjective 
społeczna embodies the sense of “social, public, co-operative”, the compound 
became unmistakably used to differentiate between the original archetypal sense 
of “justice, exercising of what is fair and what is not” and “injustice resulting 
from  the  Soviet-imposed  political  and  judicial  system,  based  on  promoting 
servility towards the new rulers of Poland (or other Comecon countries)”. Thus, 
the extralinguistic awareness of what is the reality hidden behind the elegant 
label  of  a  new  political  system  resulted  in  a  pejorative  development  of  the 
adjective  społeczna  (in  the  above-explained  sense)  into  “illusory,  spurious, 
Soviet-imposed”.  
Another example that may readily be quoted here is the evolution of the 
Polish adjective ludowa, as in demokracja ludowa (people’s democracy). To the 
citizens of Soviet-ruled Poland, demokracja was known to refer to “a typical, 
Western-style democracy, where people can enjoy both their human and civic 
10  For  example,  Kleparski  (1990:45)  founds  the  very  notion  of  semantic  evaluative 
development on: [...] the application of moral (e.g. the Decalogue), social (e.g. social conventions 
and hierarchy), legal (e.g. civil and criminal law), aesthetic and other norms which enable the 
members  of  a  community  to  classify  certain  states,  qualities,  phenomena  or  actions  as  either 
positive or negative. The existence of this system of norms has a definite bearing on language 
itself. Thus, while discussing e.g. various stages of pejorative developments of the words in the 
conceptual domain of HUMAN BEING, the author distinguishes between: (1) social pejoration; 
(2) aesthetic pejoration; (3) behavioural pejoration; and (4) moral pejoration (Kleparski 1990). 66
rights”,  whereas  demokracja  ludowa  referred  to  the  newly-imposed  political 
system of oppression and censorship, in the sense of “a totalitarian system with 
an  illusory  facade  of  a  democracy”.  Consequently,  depending  on  language-
external  factors,  the  meaning  of  ludowa,  i.e.  “people’s,  peasants”,  or  folk 
people’s”  went  down  the  evaluative  scale  to  denote  “totalitarian,  illusory, 
spurious” or even “sham”, in which case an additional deteriorative change in 
terms of language register took place. 
Notice that there are a number of examples of much older changes of the 
type discussed here, e.g. of an ameliorative character, when for the purpose of 
group  identification  and  pride  a  community  reclaim  a  term  previously  used 
against them in a derisive sense, as in the case of Yankee (possibly derived from 
Dutch Jane, a nickname for John) which had been used as a British term of 
abuse against New England settlers. Subsequently, after the Battle of Lexington 
(1775), New Englanders claimed the name for themselves, and thus the word 
underwent a dramatic semantic elevation (see Traugott and Dasher 2002:4).  
Social-economic reality  
It goes without saying that social-economic reality is a very ample source of 
extralinguistic motivations for diachronic semantic change, as social, economic 
and political contexts sometimes vary dramatically in the course of time. Thus, 
new meanings may be “officially” attached to the already existing lexical items, 
the full comprehension of which is totally dependent on an adequate amount of 
knowledge on a particular language-external context. To quote a representative 
example,  let  us  discuss  the  semantics  of A.E.  expression  new  deal  (or  New 
Deal), where – as the OED informs us – at one point of time deal ceased to 
encode  the  sense  of  “an  act  of  dealing  or  buying  and  selling;  a  business 
transaction, bargain” or the sense “a transaction of an underhand or questionable 
nature”, which might prove detrimental to the intended sense of “a private or 
secret  arrangement  in  commerce  or  politics  entered  into  by  parties  for  their 
mutual benefit”.
11 However, the New Deal acquired a very specific meaning in 
the context of the political agenda of one particular president of one particular 
country, i.e. Franklin D. Roosevelt, to the effect of “a new arrangement with a 
view  to  reform  and  betterment,  especially  the  programme  of  social  and 
economic reform in the USA planned by the Roosevelt administration of 1932 
onwards”
 12 (see the OED). 
11 See the following OED material:  
   1863   Τηε ωαρ ισ προλονγεδ,  ανδ βυτ λιττλε χηανχε οφ ιτσ ενδινγ υντιλ ωε ηαϖε α
 νεω δεαλ  // 1881 [Τηε παρτψ βοσσ] ηισ ποωερ οφ µακινγ • δεαλσ• . 
12 Hence, new dealer (New Dealer), “one who advocates or supports a new deal” (the OED). 67
Another example of this type is a very telling one, as it demonstrates a 
change  in  the  lexical  meaning  resulting  exclusively  from  the  consecutive 
changes in the characteristics of the coins in circulation in a given monetary 
system. The OED provides the following mid–19
th century definition of nickel in 
A.E. “a one-cent coin partly made of nickel (in the USA)”.
13 After nearly three 
decades the original sense gave way to the 1883 sense of “a five-cent coin”, also 
in A.E. In fact, the OED testifies to yet another, utterly surprising, semantic 
development  of  that  word,  which  clearly  resulted  from  the  social-economic 
context too, as it was a product of the hippie subculture in the USA and its 
slang.
14 Although the characteristics of the five-cent coin remained unchanged, 
the amount in question changed metonymically to as much as five dollars, but 
this time used in the slang sense of “five dollars’ worth of marijuana”
15 (see the 
OED).  
Also, under the headline of social-economic reality, social taboos must be 
categorized, which resulted in – among others – specialization of the original 
sense of the English lexical item redundant, i.e. “superabundant, superfluous, 
excessive”, which goes back to the beginning of the 17
th century (see the OED). 
To eliminate the socially disturbing ring of the word unemployed, the adjective 
redundant  (as  in  to  make  somebody  redundant)  started  to  be  used 
euphemistically in the sense of “no longer needed at work; unemployed because 
of reorganization, mechanization, change in demand, etc.” (see the OED).
16
From the cognitive linguistic perspective, while considering this example, it 
is worth noting the ingenious use of the “profile” (cf. Langacker, as in note 
1
above) or “salience” (Geeraerts 2000) of the concept expressed by the English 
adjective  redundant,  whereby  the  logical  and  fully  acceptable  schema  of 
“getting  rid  of  what  is  redundant”  in  reference  to  inanimate  or  non-human 
entities (where no moral or ethical considerations are profiled, apart from the 
purely utilitarian ones) becomes expanded to cover humans as the experiences 
of  this  activity.  Thus,  the  devastating  influence  on  someone’s  welfare  and 
financial  stability,  so  much  highlighted  in  the  expression  make  somebody 
unemployed,  becomes  relatively  harmless,  or  even  irrelevant,  as  these 
13 This, in itself, is a metonymic specialization of the original reference to one particular type 
of metal (cf. the section on metonymy below).   
14 As already mentioned, social stratification was pointed as one of the reasons for the change 
of meaning very early in the history of diachronic semantics (see Meillet 1905:74-75). 
15 Cf. the following OED quotations:  
    1967  Νιχκελ βαγσ οφ µαριϕυανα (ιν ηιππιε λινγο α • νιχκελ• ισ ∃5 ωορτη) //1968•
70 Νιχκελ...,  ονε−ειγητη το ονε−φουρτη οφ αν ουνχε οφ µαριϕυανα χοστινγ  αβουτ €φιϖε 
  δολλαρσ. Φιϖε δολλαρσ. (drug users’ jargon). 
16 Although  this  euphemism  is  nowadays  very  much  associated  with  so-called  political 
correctness, the original shift of the meaning – as the OED material shows – occurred as early as 
the late 1920s. 68
disadvantageous elements are not salient in the original frame of redundant. This 
phenomenon  may  be  also  referred  to  as  the  application  of  the  so  called 
perspectival salience (Geeraerts 2000:95).
17
Technological and civilizational progress 
In  this  sector  of  human  life,  the  accelerated  rate  of  change  of  the 
extralinguistic reality is unquestionable and needs no eleboration. Likewise, it is 
indisputable that, because of the accelerated development of human civilization, 
there  appear  a  growing  number  of  referents,  especially  as  regards  newly 
developed/discovered  human  artefacts,  which  are  frequently  associated 
(metonymically) with already existing lexical items, especially if their previous 
referents are no longer present, and the former meanings of such words become 
obsolete. As Traugot and Dasher (2002:3) put it, the nature of the lexicon is far 
from immune to reference and – therefore – it is subject to the changes in the 
life-styles and the artefacts we are surrounded by:  
 [...] the nominal domain [...] is particularly susceptible to extralinguistic factors such as 
change in the nature or the social construction of the referent. For example, the referents of towns, 
armor, rockets, vehicles, pens, communication devices, etc., have changed considerably over time, 
as have concepts of disease, hence the meanings attached to the words referring to them have 
changed [...] (Traugott and Dasher 2002:4). 
A representative example of such motivation is the example of the meaning 
of the English word car, which is understandably so much taken for granted 
nowadays.  However,  the  word  was  borrowed  from  Latin,  via  Anglo-French 
carra/carrus,
18 with its original meaning “chariot”. As early as at the end of the 
14
th  century  the  word  was  used  in  the  sense  of  “a  wheeled  vehicle  or 
conveyance; generally: a carriage, chariot, cart, wagon, truck” (see the OED). 
Thus, although car is a very common word in English today and the general 
conceptual element of wheeled vehicle is diagnostically present in the semantic 
structure of the word, no one – obviously enough – uses it in the original sense 
of “a chariot”, which has been overwhelmingly superseded by its present-day 
senses “automobile” or “a vehicle designed to move on rails, as of a railroad” 
(see the MWOD). 
Another  historical  example  is  the  development  of  the  meaning  of  the 
English word chamber, as in chamber orchestra, where chamber originally (in 
17  In his typology of lexicological salience, Geearerts (2000:94-95) mentions perspectival 
salience (highlighting), understood as the differences of perspectival attention attached to different 
parts of the overall chunk of extralinguistic reality evoked by a particular concept. 
18  Etymology:  Mid.E.  carre,  from  Anglo-French,  from  Latin  carra,  plural  of  carrum, 
alteration of carrus, of Celtic origin; akin to Latin currere, “to run” (cf. the MWOD). 69
the  13
th  century)  referred  to  “a  room  or  apartment  in  a  house;  usually  one 
appropriated to the use of one person; a private room” or “the reception-room in 
a palace” (the OED), whereas today a palace chamber is hardly expected as a 
sine qua non condition for enjoying a chamber orchestra or chamber music, i.e. 
“music and especially instrumental ensemble music intended for performance in 
a private room or small auditorium and usually having one performer for each 
part” (the MWOD). Similarly, in the case of Chamber of Commerce or Chamber 
of Industry and Commerce, etc., employed in the sense of “a board organized to 
protect the interests of commerce in a town or district etc.” (see the OED), the 
element that is profiled today is the dignified authority of a given institution, 
rather than the venue of its proceedings.  
Culture and religion 
The  importance  of  culture  (both  material  and  non-material)  and  culture-
specific concepts to the motivation of semantic change was analysed by, among 
others,  Kövecses  (1995),  Geeraerts  and  Grondelaers  (1995).  A  number  of 
convincing examples of how a knowledge of the cultural context facilitates the 
understanding of the semantic development of a given expression are discussed 
in Geeraerts (2002). While discussing figurative shifts, the author observes that:  
 [...] motivation often results from cultural changes. More often than not, the background 
image that motivates the figurative shift is an aspect of the material or the immaterial culture of a 
language community – and when the culture changes, the imagistic motivation may lose its force 
(Geeraerts 2002:442). 
And so, for example, the meaning of the Dutch expression met spek schieten
(to shoot with bacon) is “to tell a tall story, to boast”. His explanation of this 
apparently totally incomprehensible motivation is grounded in the knowledge of 
the language-external culture of old-time sea warriors: 
Apparently, enemy ships were shot at with bacon (and similar fat substances) to facilitate 
setting them afire; the interpretation “to boast” can then be reached through the intermediary of 
an interpretation “to subject someone to verbal aggression, to overpower someone verbally”. In 
this  case,  the  relevant  knowledge  belongs  to  the  material  culture  of  old-time  warfare  at  sea 
(Geeraerts 2002:442). 
Along  similar  lines,  note  that  the  English expression come through with 
flying colours also has its roots in the military art of the olden days. However, 
the culture-specific motivation underlying this semantic development is perhaps 
more readily comprehensible, as our understanding of the meaning of the phrase 
does  not  require  any  knowledge  of  the  maritime  lifestyle  of  one  particular 
militant  nation,  but  is  conditioned  by  the  knowledge  of  the  Pan-European 
chivalric  traditions  of  knighthood. The present-day meaning “to complete an 70
impressively difficult task or trial very successfully”, is easy to decode if one is 
aware of the custom started in Mediaeval Europe that a victorious army or a 
knight left the battlefield proudly flying their banners (i.e. colours
19), whereas 
the defeated party and the prisoners of war were never awarded that honour.
20
According to the CIDI, this phrase is used in the above-explained sense not only 
in  B.E.,  but  also  A.E.  and  Au.E.,  despite  that  –  due  to  obvious  historical 
constraints – it is hardly possible to refer to any chivalric lifestyle in the New 
World  or  the  Antipodes.  Thus,  it  is  clearly  noticeable  that  the  phrase  has 
continued to be used in its new sense long after its original meaning had become 
irrelevant and forgotten. 
It is beyond doubt that religion is a very important element of culture-
specific  considerations,  closely  related  to  the  lifestyle  and  the  values 
cherished  by  a  given  community.  Unsurprisingly,  apart  from  being  an 
abundant source of lexical borrowings, religious concepts have a great bearing 
on the changes in the meanings of the lexical items already existing in the 
target language. An illustrative example of such a motivation is offered by the 
semantic evolution of the English noun heaven. The original O.E. sense of this 
word was “the sky, the firmament, the expanse in which the sun, moon, clouds 
and stars are seen”. With the advent of Christianity, as early as at the turn of 
the  10
th  century,  the  word  underwent  a  process  of  semantic  extension  to 
comprise not only certain elements of our natural environment, but also the 
Christian concept of “the celestial abode of immortal beings; the habitation of 
God, angels, beatified spirits, etc., usually placed in the realms beyond the 
sky; the state of the blessed afterlife” (see the OED). During the course of its 
history, apart from the widening of the meaning, also an evaluative semantic 
development may also be said to have occurred in this case, i.e. amelioration 
(elevation) of the meaning.
21
 However, the addition of a religious sense, on top of the previously profane 
ones, was not the only influence exerted by religious dogmas and concepts on 
19 Interestingly enough, that the meaning of colour in the sense of “a flag, ensign, or standard 
of a knight, land, regiment or a ship” is in itself a metonymic development of the previous sense 
“hue, tint” (e.g. as in the Trooping of the Colour ceremony). According to the OED, the original 
sense dates back to the late 14
th century, whereas the aforesaid semantic development started as 
early as at the turn of the 15
th century:  
χ.1400  Αλλ ηορ χολουρισ το κεν ωερε οφ χλενε ψαλοω. // χ.1420  Τηε κνψ•τε  ιν ηισ 
χολυρσ ωασ αρµιτ φυλ χλενε.
20 Compare the culture-specific fabric of this expression with that of to return with the shield, 
whose sense is also built on an underlying schema resulting from the widely known precept that a 
Spartan warrior must return from a battle with a shield or on a shield, but never without a shield 
(meaning “victorious or dead, but never a survivor of a lost battle”). 
21  For  an  extensive  treatment  of  evaluative  (pejorative  and  ameliorative)  semantic 
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the meaning of this word. Over the course of time, the Christian concept of 
heaven as “the state of ultimate bliss in the afterlife, as God’s reward for the 
righteous” figuratively infiltrated into the domain of this life’s lay pleasures and 
the meaning of the noun
22 expanded even further to accommodate the senses of 
“a place like or compared to heaven; a place of supreme bliss” and “a state of 
supreme felicity and ecstatic happiness” in the second half of the 14
th century 
(see the OED). Also at the very same time, another semantic expansion of the 
word occurred, based on the association of the Christian concept of the place of 
heavenly bliss with the “seat of the celestial deities of heathen mythology”.
23
Note that a number of the semantic shifts motivated by religious considerations 
frequently  involve  religious  taboos  as  a  very  potent underlying factor in the 
change in word meaning. 
Another point worth emphasizing is that a knowledge of culture seems to 
be necessary for discovering the motivation behind the cases of eponymy, i.e. 
the phenomenon whereby a proper name develops a general sense built onto 
its original meaning or associations,
24 as in Kleenex, the noun that originated 
as  the  proprietary  name  of  an  absorbent  disposable  cleansing  paper  tissue 
manufactured by one particular company, in the early 20
th century (see the 
OED), but – over the course of time – the word assumed the generic sense of 
“a cleansing tissue” (see the MWOD). Another typical example of an eponym 
is Phyrric victory used in the sense “a victory gained at too great a cost”.
25 As 
eponymy – apart from being rooted in the encyclopaedic knowledge of culture 
– involves the mechanisms of a metonymic transfer of meaning, for further 
discussion see the section on metonymy below.  
Now,  let  us  turn  our  attention  to  a  spectacular  category  of  culturally-
motivated semantic developments constituted by the cases of what has come to 
be  known  as  zoosemy  (animal  metaphor),  pertaining  to  the  conceptual 
macrocategory  HUMAN  BEING,  which  has  been  recently  given  a  detailed 
discussion by, among others, Kiełtyka and Kleparski (2005), Kiełtyka (2006) 
and Kiełtyka (this volume). The authors analyse cases of zoosemy against the 
22 Compare the semantics of its derivative adjective heavenly. 
23 It is worth mentioning that within the religious senses of heaven, a typical metonymic 
development also occurs (as early as at the turn of the 10
th century), whereby “the celestial abode” 
becomes used in the sense of the authority it represents: “the power or majesty of heaven; He who 
dwells above; Providence, God”, as in the OED example: 
1667 Τηε ωιλλ ανδ ηιγη περµισσιον οφ αλλ−ρυλινγ Ηεαϖεν. 
24 Eponym may be defined as the name of a person, whether real or fictitious, who has (or is 
thought to have) given rise to the name of a particular place, tribe, discovery or other item (cf. the 
WOLE). 
25 This eponym is an allusion to the exclamation attributed to Pyrrhus after the battle of 
Asculum in Apulia (in which he routed the Romans, but with the loss of the flower of his army), 
“One more such victory and we are lost” (see the OED). 72
background  of  the  so-called  Great  Chain  of  Being  metaphor.
26  Various 
metaphorical mappings, either in the upward or downward direction, are enabled 
by  the  invariably  hierarchical  structure  of  the  metaphor,  as  presented  by 
Krzeszowski (1997:68): 
GOD 
HUMANS 
ANIMALS 
PLANTS 
INORGANIC THINGS 
Thus, the conceptual category of e.g. HUMAN BEING becomes a target 
for numerous lexical items within the attributive paths of e.g. the following 
domains: DOMAIN OF FUNCTIONS […]; DOMAIN OF CHARACTER, 
BEHAVIOUR  AND  MORALITY  […];  DOMAIN  OF  ABUSE  […];
DOMAIN  OF  ORIGIN  AND  RANK  […]  and  DOMAIN  OF 
STATE/CONDITION […] (cf. Kiełtyka and Kleparski 2005:27).  
The semantic evolution of the English noun dog may serve as an example. 
Apart from its original sense, the word developed a new sense as early as the 
14
th  century,  when  the  following  figurative  use  of  the  word  appeared:  “a 
person;  in  reproach,  abuse,  or  contempt:  a  worthless,  despicable,  surly,  or 
cowardly fellow” (see the OED).
27 In the 17
th century the term underwent an 
ameliorative change into the sense of “a gay or jovial man, a gallant; a fellow, 
a chap”.
28 Surprisingly, depending on which aspects of the meaning of dog 
gained prominence, there have been pejorative changes, e.g. into “an informer, 
a traitor; especially one who betrays fellow criminals” (in the 19
th and 20
th
century American and Australian slang – cf. the OED
 29), as well as those of an 
ameliorative  nature. An  example  of  such  seems  to be the semantics of the 
English expression, dogged does it, where the competitive brutality of the life 
in  a  pack  is  no  longer  profiled.  Instead,  the  element  of  hardworking  and 
persevering diligence, also present in the conceptual field of dog, come to be 
associated with a very positive message. Thus, in this case the attributes of a 
26 The concept of the Great Chain of Being – developed by the ancient philosophers, such as 
Plato and Aristotle – was previously brought up by Lakoff and Turner (1989). 
27 Cf. the OED quotation: 
χ.1325  ϑηον ∆οψλψ+σλοωγη ηψµ+Ανδ σαψδε: •∆ογγε, τη ερ τηου λψ!•
28 Cf. the OED: 
   1711 Αν ιµπυδεντ ψουνγ ∆ογ βιδ τηε Φιδδλερσ πλαψ α ∆ανχε χαλλεδ Μολ. Πατλεψ.
29 Cf. the OED: 
  1846 ∆ιχκ Ωηιτε ηασ βεεν πλαψινγ τηε •δογ•, ανδ η ε ανδ τηε •χοππερσ• αρε νοω ω
ιτηιν τεν µινυτεσ οφ τηε ηουσε.73
canine may be said to be transferred to a higher level of the Great Change of 
Being.
30
Psychological factors 
Semantic changes motivated by psychological factors, which account for 
another  group  of  language-external  causes  of  sense  development,  are  all-
pervasive  and  –  paradoxically  –  frequently  remain  unnoticed,  as  they  are 
generated  almost  unconsciously  by  language  users,  who  have  been  mostly 
brought up and taught to maintain a good rapport with other members of their 
speech  community.  Thus,  speakers’  own  individualities  and  sensitivities 
influence the language they use to facilitate interpersonal and social exchange 
by taking account of their interlocutors’ idiosyncrasies of the same type. An 
extreme  example  of  such  a  deliberate  approach,  verging  almost  on  self-
censorship, is the notorious principle of political correctness.
31 As insightfully 
observed by Grzega (2002): 
The notion of “political correctness” is on the edge of societal and institutional reasons and 
could theoretically be subsumed under these two. However, political correctness is, first of all, a 
term that is so well embedded in modern thinking and, second, a notion that stands out because it 
refers entirely to human beings (and derivable terms) that it should be listed as a separate motive 
[of  lexical  choices].  When  speaking  of  “nigger”,  for  instance,  political  correctness  can  be 
regarded as the modern form of taboo (Grzega 2002:1036).
32
Grzega (2004:21) expounds that taboo refers to the desire of avoiding [sic]
a specific (growingly stigmatized) designation for a concept with “undesirable” 
aspects. Having no intention to embark on yet another discussion of the widely 
known examples of major types of taboos
33 below we shall focus our attention 
on two major taboo oriented motivations of semantic change, that is political 
correctness and religion. 
To discuss a most illustrative example of the motivation by the political 
correctness  taboo,  let us consider the history of English adjective/noun gay. 
Although it is politically correct to approve of homosexuality as another equally 
30 For another angle on the issues of zoosemy see Kiełtyka and Kleparski (this volume) on the 
non-Indo-European animal metaphor. 
31 For the issue of political correctness, lexicon and semantics, see e.g. Allan and Burridge 
(1991), Burridge (1996), Kleparski and Martynuska (2002) and Grzega (2002). 
32 The word in bold has been stressed on our volition. 
33 For example, Grzega (2004:21) distinguishes between the following: 1) mystic or religious 
taboos, the so-called taboos of fear (e.g. evil spirit, ghost, etc.); 2) taboos of intimate things, the so-
called taboos of propriety (e.g. ugly, urinate, etc.); 3) taboos of moral misdeeds, the so-called 
taboos  of  delicacy  (e.g.  evil).  Lexical  replacements  for  taboo  terms  are  called  taboo-driven 
euphemisms (Grzega 2004). 74
valid  and  justifiable  form  of  human  sexual  behaviour,  on  a  par  with 
heterosexuality, the very term homosexual has become deemed offensive and 
ostracized, i.e. underwent a pejorative semantic change (which is surprisingly 
inconsistent from the gay-oriented point of view). Consequently – as stipulated 
by the proponents of the semantic field theory,
34 – another lexical item had to fill 
in  the  gap  in  the  conceptual  field,  and  the  word  gay  became  the  socially 
acceptable term of reference with the same intended meaning.  
Thus,  sexual  and  social  taboo  motivated  the  most  recent  semantic 
expansions of gay, which were, inter alia “light-hearted, exuberantly cheerful, 
sportive, merry”,
35 “bright or lively-looking, esp. in colour; brilliant, showy”,
36
“finely or showily dressed” 
37 (in the early 14
th century as the OED material 
shows), or “brilliant, attractive, charming” (used for abstract referents, from the 
early 16
th to the late 18
th century
38). There was a pattern of manifest pejorative 
developments  of  the  meaning,  probably  due  to  the  lack  of  discretion  and 
responsibility,  becoming  a  more  and  more  salient  sense  of  the  word,  as  in 
“addicted  to  social  pleasures  and  dissipations;  of  loose  or  immoral  life 
(especially in gay dog, i.e. a man given to revelling or self-indulgence)” (from 
the  early  17
th  to  mid–19
th  century),  “impertinent,  too  free  in  conduct,  over-
familiar”
39 (U.S. slang at the turn of the 19
th century), “of a woman: leading an 
immoral life, living by prostitution”
40 (19
th century slang). Then, in the early 20
th
century (see the OED), the pejorative slang sense “of a person: homosexual; of a 
place: frequented by homosexuals” appeared, which – in turn – has recently 
become  officially  anointed  by  the  power  of  political  correctness  as  the 
preferable polite term of reference to a male or female homosexual person. It is 
important to note that whether that final development should be perceived as a 
case  of  amelioration  or  as  a  continuation  of  the  pejorative  tendency  seems 
controversial and, as Crystal (1995:138) puts it, depends on factors that are 
more to do with personal taste and morality than with language.  
Apart from personal or social taboos, religious taboo seems to have been a 
very potent driving force behind the operation of many semantic alterations. For 
example, within the Christian doctrine, the Third Commandment requires that 
thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain.
41 Thus, the observance 
34 See, for example, the work of Trier (1931) and Lehrer (1974). 
35 The OED:   χ.1310  Γραχιουσε, στουτ, αντ Γαψ, Γεντιλ, ϕολψφ σο τηε ϕαψ. 
36 The OED:  χ.1386  ςπον ηισ αρµ ηε βααρ α γαψ βραχερ. 
37 The OED:  1387  Χλεοπατρα µαδε ηερε γαψ. 
38 The OED:  1529  Τηοσε ρεασονσ σεµεδ .. γαψ ανδ γλοριουσ ατ τηε φιρστ σιγητ. 
39 The OED:  1911  Ανδ Ι ωουλδν∋τ γετ γαψ ρουνδ ηερ. 
40 The OED:  1857  Τηε γαψ ωοµεν, ασ τηεψ αρε τερµεδ, αρε ωορσε οφφ τηαν 
Αµεριχαν σλαϖεσ. 
41 Quoted from the King James Version of the Bible (also: the Authorized Version or the 
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of religious precepts results in semantic expansions of the otherwise neutral and 
profane lexical items, in which the element of the supernatural may become 
salient besides the previously applicable profile of “power, authority”, as in Lord 
(Our Lord), Our Lady, or the Queen of Heaven. Due to their unmistakable sense 
of referring to a person being in authority, powerful enough to make his/her 
servants  both  fear  and  admire  him/her,  the  meanings  of  these  lexical  items 
expanded  to  accommodate  the  supernatural  sense  practically  as  soon  as 
Christianity was introduced to the English soil.  
To demonstrate that, let us compare some of the senses of the noun lord (cf. 
the OED), that is the late–9
th century sense of “one who has dominion over 
others as his subjects, or to whom service and obedience are due; a master, chief, 
prince, sovereign”,
42 the early-mid–10
th century sense of “a master of servants; 
the male head of a household”,
43 or the early–10
th century sense of “a feudal 
superior” 
44  and  the  sense  of  “God”,
45  which  appeared  as  early  as  at  the 
beginning of the 10
th century. Note that a similar development took place in the 
case of queen, whose late–9
th century sense of “a king’s wife or consort”
46 and 
the even earlier sense of “a woman who is the chief ruler of a state, having the 
same rank and position as a king”
47 and the sense of “Virgin Mary, esp. in such 
phrases as: Queen of glory, grace, heaven, paradise, etc.”,
48 which dates from as 
early as the beginning of the 9
th century (cf. the OED).
49
Another important area of semantic change where individual sensitivities and 
compassion are responsible for its psychological motivation is the application of 
euphemism. Some authors distinguish as many as seven categories of euphemisms 
involving the development of a novel sense for some established word or word 
combination (Warren 1992:133), without the use of word formation mechanisms. 
Let us present Warren’s (1992) classification in extenso: 
1. Particularisation: when a general term becomes “particularised” in a certain 
context  to  create  a  new  sense,  e.g.  innocent  (in  the  sense:  “of  a  virgin, 
virginal”); 
2. Implication:  e.g.  loose,  which  implies  the  sense  “unattached”,  and  then, 
consequently “sexually available”; 
42 See the OED:  χ893 Οητηερε σ￿δε ηισ ηλαφορδε, ∅λφρεδε χψνινγε, ￿￿τ [ετχ.].
43 See the OED: 
950  Εαδι… ￿ ε ￿ ε…ν ￿ ονε µι￿ ￿ ψ χψµεσ ηλαφερδ ηισ ον−φανδ συα δοενδε.
44 See the OED:  1000  Ηινε …εχεσ .. το ηλαφορδε Σχοττα χψνινγ.
45 See the OED:  χ1000 Σψ λοφ ￿αµ Ηλαφορδε ￿ ε λεοφα￿  ον εχνψσσε.
46 See the OED: 
893 ∅φτερ ηισ δεα￿ ε Σαµεραµισ ηισ χωεν [Λ. υξορ] φενγχ..το ￿￿µ ριχε.
47 See the OED:  χ.825 ∅τστοδ χωοεν [Λ. ρεγινα] το σωι￿ ραν ￿ ιρ.
48 See the OED:  χ.900 Χynewulf Χηριστ 276 Σεο χλ￿νεστε χωεν οφερ εορ￿αν.
49 Compare the examples to that of heaven discussed in the Culture and religion section. 76
3. Metaphor: e.g. thick (in the sense of “stupid”), where the image of a dense 
environment obstructing the progress of a traveller seems to be a mapping of 
a reasonable thought going through the medium which is someone’s head; 
4. Metonymy (general-for-specific): e.g. problem (in the sense of “a disease, 
medical condition”), as in alcohol problem; 
5. Reversal (irony): e.g. blessed in the sense of “damned” (cf. Stern, 1931); 
6. Understatement (litotes): as in sleep in the sense of “die”; 
7. Overstatement (hyperbole): e.g. glory, as in fight to glory, in the sense of 
“death”.  
Importantly, it is easy to observe the fact that – in fact – despite such a 
detailed  classification  of  euphemisms,  the  mechanism  of  the  origin  of  the 
particular  categories  of  the  process  may  be  accounted  for  by  the  universal 
cognitive  mechanisms  of  categorization,  conceptualization,  embodiment,  etc., 
which find reflection in the way how metaphors, hyperboles, etc., are formed. 
Another  area  of  great  interest  of  psychologically  motivated  semantic 
developments is the category of synaesthesia (from Greek syn “with or joined 
together” and aesthesis “sensation”, which means “the union of the senses”). In a 
strictly  physiological  sense,  synaesthesia  is  a  cognitive  mechanism  when  a 
stimulus to one sense, such as eyesight or smell, is simultaneously perceived by 
one or more additional sense, e.g. hearing. This phenomenon has given rise to 
synaesthesia understood as stylistic figure, endowing a given object (entity) with a 
characteristic  which  it  cannot  display,  as  the  object  and  the  characteristic  are 
perceived using different senses, as in the case of e.g. a sour face, where the sense 
of taste is juxtaposed with eyesight. Thus, by a semantic shift or a transfer of a 
semantic  feature,  a  relation  is  established  between  semantically  incompatible 
elements, which denote sensations from different spheres of sensory cognition (cf. 
Ward and Simner 2003).
50
As regards the case of sour, there have been a whole array of synasthetic 
developments of the senses of the adjective, which seem to have moved a long 
way from its original sense of “having a tart or acid taste, such as that which is 
characteristic of unripe fruits and vinegar; opposed to sweet, and distinguished 
from  bitter”  at  the  turn  of  the  10
th  century  (see  the  OED).  Throughout  the 
semantic history of the word, the synaesthetic developments have given rise to 
the  following  new  senses:  “having  a  harsh,  morose,  or  peevish  disposition; 
50 Note that again, as in so many examples discussed in this section, the cases of synaesthesia 
may  be  considered  as  instances  of  metaphor,  on  grounds  of  the  inseparability  of  categories, 
concepts  and  the  ubiquity  of  the  mechanism  of  human  experience  embodiment  (Lakoff  and 
Johnson, 1999:19). On the other hand, however, due to the contiguity of the sensations, despite the 
fact  that  they  are  perceived  by  different  senses,  synaesthesia  may  be  explained  in  terms  of 
metonymic transfer. 77
sullen, gloomy, discontented”
51 (early 13
th century); the sense “of smell”
52 (early 
14
th  century);  “displaying,  expressing,  or  implying  displeasure  or  discontent; 
peevish, cross (of looks, etc)”
53 (early 15
th century); “cold and wet; uncongenial 
through retaining stagnant moisture (of land, etc.)” (early 16
th century)
54; “out of 
tune (of music)”
55 (late–16
th century); “wry, distorted”
56 (early 17
th century). The 
last in the series of innovations was the apparently unmotivated sense “heavy, 
coarse, gross (of animals)”
57 (early 18
th century). 
 As regards the astounding pattern of the aforementioned developments, it may 
be observed that although particular instances of derivation of novel meanings may 
seem surprisingly unmotivated, certain regularities in synaesthetic developments 
are there to be found. For example, Ullmann (1964) claims that: 
 […]  the  movement  of  synaesthetic  metaphors  is  not  haphazard  but  conforms  to  a basic 
pattern. I [...] have found three tendencies which stood out very clearly: (1) transfers from the 
lower to the more differentiated senses [i.e. hearing and vision]
58 were more frequent than those in 
the opposite direction: over 80 per cent of a total of 2000 examples showed this 'upward' trend; 
(2) touch was in each case the largest single source, and (3) sound the largest recipient [...] 
(Ullmann 1964:86). 
Obviously enough, there are also cases of synaesthetic developments which 
are much more straightforward, compared with the complexity of the previous 
example, such as white, as in white lie or white magic, where the change is 
easily  explainable,  e.g.  in  terms  of the transfer or mapping of the “spotless, 
unblemished, unstained” component of the original conceptual domain onto the 
target domain. The original senses of white, i.e. “of the colour of snow or milk; 
fully  luminous  and  devoid  of  any  distinctive  hue”
59  (mid–10
th  century), 
“colourless,  uncoloured,  as  glass  or  other  transparent  substance” 
60  (late  9
th
century) or “blank, not written or printed upon”
61 (mid–15
th century) expanded, 
51 As in the following example extracted from the OED:  c.1225  Grucchunge  of  bitter  &  of 
sur heorte. 
52  See  the  OED:  1340  Οφ ηερβεσ ανδ τρεσ χοµεσ σωετε σαϖουρ, Ανδ οφ ￿ε χοµεσ   
  ωλατσοµε στψνκ, ανδ σουρ.
53 See the OED:   c.1440 With a sowr cowntenance and a froward luke. 
54 See the OED:   1532 Ωηατ ρεµεδψ ισ τηερε, ιφ τηε γρουνδε βε το ωεετε το σοωε ιν  
  ιτ, ορ το σουρε το σετ τρεεσ ιν ιτ?
55 See the OED:   1593 Ηοω σοωρε σωεετ Μυσιχκε ισ, Ωηεν Τιµε ισ βροκε ανδ νο  
  Προπορτιον κεπτ?
56 See the OED:   1611  Μοργυευρ, α µακερ οφ στρανγε µουτηεσ, ορ σουρε φαχεσ. 
57 See the OED:   1713  Α στρονγ, σοωερ Ηορσε οφ 6 λ. Πριχε. 
58 See Ullmann (1964). 
59 See the OED example:   χ.950  Τυοε…ε ενγλεσ ιν ηυιτυµ …ε…ερελυµ.
60 See the OED:  χ.888  ∅…￿ ερ …ε ηωιτε …ιµµασ …ε ρεαδε. 
61 See the OED: 
1466  Ψε σεψε ￿ατ ψε ηαϖε παιδ ￿ε µονεψ: ￿ερ φορ ψ σενδε ψοωε τηε ωριττε ωηιτε.78
inter  alia  into  “morally  or  spiritually  pure  or  stainless;  spotless,  unstained, 
innocent”
62 (late 10
th century); “free from malignity or evil intent; beneficent, 
innocent, harmless”
63 (a much later, although quite a similar change dating back 
to  the  mid–17
th  century);  and  the  relatively  recent  sense  of  “lacking  any 
emotional coloration (of a singing voice or its sound) – cf. It. voce bianca
64
(since the late 19
th century).  
Williams (1976) – clearly in search of regularities of meaning evolution – 
analyzes a number of adjectives whose meanings have undergone metaphorical 
transfer via synaesthesia, and the major generalisation offered by the author is 
this: a “touch” word may transfer to “taste” or directly to “colour” or “sound”, 
e.g.  soft  sound,  hard  sound.  A  “taste”  word  may  transfer  to  “smell”  or  to 
“sound”,  e.g.  sour  sound,  sweet  voice.  Furthermore,  “dimension”  adjectives 
transfer to “colour” or to “sound”, e.g. flat colour, deep sound and “colour” 
words may transfer to “sound” or vice versa, e.g. loud colour, clear sound.
65
In  the  prior  sections  numerous  types  of  the  traditional  extralinguistic 
motivations for diachronic semantic change have been discussed. However, the 
division lines between the factors outlined above, delineated with the aid of 
traditionally  acknowledged  formal  concepts  of  rhetorical  figures  of  speech, 
prove  to  be  volatile  and  overlap  with  one  another. As  the  reader  must  have 
noticed,  a  number  of  the  semantic  innovations  included  under  the  separate 
headings share – symptomatically – the same or similar mechanisms accounting 
for  why  and  how  the  given  innovation  was  possible,  regardless  of  what 
figurative shift was the result of these same mechanisms (e.g. whether a taboo-
avoiding euphemism or a hyperbole).
66 Let us stress that this is hardly surprising 
when  one  realises  the  ubiquity  of  the  cognitive  mechanisms  of  human 
perception and their universal applicability to human language – as is argued in 
the  theoretical  part  of  this  paper,  wherein  we  emphasized  the  importance  of 
cognitive linguistics to the analysis of semantic change.  
In  an  attempt  to  prove  our  point,  let  us  consider,  for  example,  the 
mechanism of metonymy, which in the foregoing sections was mentioned in the 
context  of  the  influence  of:  social-economic  reality;  technological  and 
62 See the OED: 
   971  [...] ∆ριητεν ￿￿τ η￿ββε σωα ηωιτε σαυλε σωα ￿εοσ ηαλι…ε Μαριε?
63 See the OED: 
1651 Ηε διδ νοτ κνοω ωηετηερ ηισ αδµονισηερ ωερε βλαχκ ορ ωηιτε .. αν εϖιλλ ορ α 
γοοδ σπιριτ. 
64 See the OED: 1884 • Ωηιτε ϖοιχε•.  Τηε φεµαλε ανδ χηιλδρεν∋σ ϖοιχεσ,  ανδ αλ σο  
  σοµε βριγητ−σουνδινγ ινστρυµεντσ, αρε τηυσ χαλλεδ. 
65 As observed in Kleparski (1988:42), there seem to exist some exceptions to this general 
scheme. Note, for example, that smoky taste seems to be a reverse from “smell” to “taste”. 
66 Note that in the case of synaesthetic developments, both metaphors and metonymies are 
pointed to as the mechanisms responsible for the change (cf. footnote 
45 above). 79
civilizational progress. Traditionally, metonymy has been defined in the context 
of broadly understood contiguity, i.e. proximity in terms of space, time, part-
whole relations or cause-and-effect relations (see, e.g. Ullmann 1959:231–234).  
The relationship of contiguity is also emphasized within cognitive linguistics, 
where metonymy may be defined using the concepts of idealized cognitive models 
(ICMs), as in Lakoff (1987); conceptual mappings, as in Radden and Kövecses 
(1999);  a  reference  point  (activation)  phenomenon,  as  in  Langacker  (1999);
67
scenarios,  as  in  Panther  and  Thornburg  (1999);  mapping  and  highlighting 
combinations, as in Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez (2000); or domain highlighting, as in 
Croft (2002). For example, Taylor (2003) defines metonymy as: 
 […] a figure of speech whereby the name of one entity e1 is used to refer to another entity e2 
which is contiguous to e1. […] The essence of metonymy resides in the possibility of establishing 
connections  between  entities  which  co-occur  within  a  given  conceptual  structure  (Taylor 
2003:122–24).
Thus, it should be stressed that regardless of which of the aforementioned 
specific concepts (whose nuances are mostly compatible within the cognitive 
linguistic  theory)  is  applied,  metonymic  transfers  occur  within  the  same 
conceptual  domain  (cognitive  model,  frame,  etc.),  whereas  the  contiguity 
relations connect the elements of a domain (frame etc.) with one another, as well 
as  its  particular  elements  with  the  domain  (frame  etc.)  as  a  whole  –  which 
obviously – necessitates encyclopaedic knowledge (cf. Koch 2004).
Some typical examples of a metonymic change of meaning in the history of 
English  involve  face,  employed  in  the  sense  of  “a  person”  (as  in  the  OED
quotation Now this face was the ideal man for me to have a deal with
68); gun or 
rifle  (in  the  sense  of  “a  soldier  fighting  with  a gun or a rifle”). In the first 
example, a face in the late–13
th century sense of “the front part of the head, from 
the  forehead  to  the  chin;  the  visage,  countenance” 
69  belongs  to  the  same 
conceptual field as “a person”, whereas the conceptual structure of that field 
allows for the contiguous relation between seeing a face and seeing a person. 
Similarly, in the latter example, a rifle and a rifleman are contiguously related by 
the same frame, in which a soldier is perceived as inseparable from his weapon. 
Note that the aforementioned examples could not be classified as cases of 
extralinguistically motivated semantic change in the light of the traditional, pre-
cognitive  linguistic, understanding of the term extralinguistic. However, it is 
important  to  stress  that  their  semantic  development  does  follow  the  paths 
delineated  not  by  the  language  itself,  but  rather  by  the  language-external 
67 In the sense that the entity that is normally designated by a metonymic expression serves as 
a  reference  point  affording  mental  access  to  the  desired  target,  i.e.  the  entity  actually  being 
referred to (Langacker 1999:199). 
68 The sense dates back to the mid-20
th century (see the OED). 
69 See the OED example:  χ1290 Μορε βλοδ ￿αρ νασ ιν αλ ισ φαχε.80
mechanisms  of  human  cognition,  such  as  conceptualization,  categorization, 
embodiment,  etc. Thus,  one  may  claim  that  such semantic developments are
extralinguistically  motivated,  as  their  origin  is  not  motivated  by  some 
language-dependent  patterns,  e.g.  of  figurative  speech,  but  by  the  language-
external mechanisms grounded in human cognition. 
Another  interesting  case  in  point  here  is  the  semantic  evolution  of  the 
English  noun  pentagon.  Its  original  late–16
th  century  sense  was  “a  figure, 
usually a plane rectilinear figure, having five angles and five sides” (see the 
OED), while in the mid–20
th century the word came to denote (by the contiguous 
relationship of the shape) the pentagonal building in Washington, D.C., housing 
the headquarters of the U.S. Department of Defence. Soon afterwards, the sense 
of  the  Pentagon  (spelled  with  a  capital,  as  a  newly  acquired  proper  name) 
expanded to cover the sense of “the U.S. military leadership” (cf. the OED and 
the  MWOD),  or  even  “the  U.S.  military  forces,  the  U.S.  military  might  or 
presence”. It seems that the latter case of expansion of the meaning occurred via 
another  metonymic  transfer,  based  on  the  co-occurrence,  within  the  same 
conceptual  structure  of  the  U.S.  military,  of  one  specific  building  and  one 
specific type of human activity it was related to. 
Simultaneously,  one  feels  justified  in  saying  that  the  sense  development 
discussed here may be considered a case of eponymy. Interestingly, the very term 
eponym itself constitutes a most illustrative example of how the phenomenon of 
eponymy is based on the mechanism of metonymic semantic transfer. The word 
itself is of Greek etymology (eponymos – “named after a thing or person”, “giving 
one’s name to a thing or person”
70). The set of historical meanings includes “an 
ancient state official (an Assyrian one (893–666 BC), an archon
71 in Athens or a 
Roman consul), whose name was used in chronology to refer to the period of time 
covered by his term of office”.
72 By a metonymic transfer, another sense of the 
word appeared: “a person, real, mythological or a literary character, who gave 
his/her name to something”.
73 Finally, eponym developed the sense of  “the word 
or expression derived from the name or surname of a real or fictitious person”
74 – 
which happened through yet another metonymic change, as the frame (conceptual 
structure, etc.) involving 1) a person giving his/her name to 2) another person thing 
or entity necessitates – understandably – the relation of contiguity between its 
elements 1) and 2).  
70 Cf. the SEWO (translation ours). 
71 Cf. the EBO entry: in ancient Greece, the chief magistrate or magistrates in many city-
states [...] In Athens, nine archons divided state duties: the archon eponymous headed the boule 
and Ecclesia [...].
72 Cf. the SEWO  (translation ours). 
73 Cf. the SEWO  (translation ours). 
74 Cf. the SEWO  (translation ours). 81
It is beyond doubt that not all cases of eponymy require such an extensive 
encyclopaedic knowledge as in the previous example and many of them function 
unobtrusively in everyday language. Let us consider the history of the English 
word china, in its 17
th century sense of “a species of earthenware of a fine semi-
transparent  texture,  originally  manufactured  in  China,  and  first  brought  to 
Europe in the 16
th c. by a Portuguese, who named it porcelain. Early in the 18
th
century the product began to be manufactured in Europe” (see the OED).
75 One 
may conclude that the very name of the country whose material culture invented 
porcelain is perpetuated in the word referring to it. However, its original sense 
of  that  specific  “ware  from  China”  is  no  longer  present,  as  the  word  has 
gradually become the common name of the material, regarded as “the ware made 
of china or porcelain”.
76 Nevertheless, one finds grounds to claim that it is the 
metonymic  relationship  between  the  elements  of  the  original  conceptual 
structure, i.e. the place of origin and the type of product manufactured there, that 
made the aforesaid sense development possible. 
Also, it is worth emphasizing that metonymic change may be viewed as an 
effective means of taboo avoidance
77 due to the possibility it gives of the subtle 
mutual adjustments of the salient and non-salient elements of a given conceptual 
frame, as argued in the following text taken from Langacker (1993): 
 […] metonymy allows an efficient reconciliation of two conflicting factors: the need to be 
accurate, i.e. of being sure that the addressee’s attention is directed to the target; and our natural 
inclination to think and talk explicitly about those entities that have the greatest cognitive salience 
for us (Langacker 1993:30).  
Concluding remarks 
In  the  above  work,  a  number  of  extralinguistic  factors  traditionally 
acknowledged to motivate semantic innovations have been outlined. As argued 
in the respective sections, they have been traditionally associated with different 
areas  of  the  language-external  activities  of  the  human  being  and  various 
products of human culture – in the widest sense, whether material or immaterial 
– which find their reflections in the semantics of the vocabulary of the language 
of a given speech community.
78
75 Cf. the OED:  china-ware (“ware from China”), soon clipped to china. 
76 That is the so-called species-used-for-genus type of metonymic development. 
77 Cf. the sections on taboos and euphemisms. 
78 For the issues of culture-specific vocabulary and the areas of extralinguistic human activity 
especially  prone  to  influence  the  language  inherent  in  a  given  culture,  see,  among  others,  
Cymbalista (2003). 82
However, the application of the analytical tools of cognitive linguistics for 
the  discussion  of  a  variety  of  the  sense  developments  quoted  gives  tangible 
evidence and support to the original assumption that – in fact – any case of 
diachronic semantic change may – to varying degree – be treated as a reflection 
of the language-external mechanisms of human cognition. These mechanisms 
are  not  rooted  in  the  extralinguistic  reality  surrounding  the  users  of  any 
language, but rather they are anchored in the basic facts of life related to how 
the  human  brain  works  and  what  the  modes  of  operation  of  this  exquisite 
interface between the human thought and the world around the human body are. 
The cognitive mechanisms of the human brain – determined by the biological 
constitution of the human body – obviously enough constitute another aspect of 
the language-external context of human language use. 
Notwithstanding  the  conventional  classifications  of  the  language-external 
motivations for semantic change, the expanded, cognitively grounded approach 
to meaning development advocated and – hopefully – justified by the authors of 
this  paper  seems  to  be  methodologically adequate, regardless of the heading 
under which a given case could be traditionally classified, whether as a result of 
a specific type of extralinguistic motivation, or not.  
In the light of the cognitive apparatus, we believe its justifiable to claim that 
any case of extralinguistically (in the traditional sense of the word
79) motivated 
semantic developments may be expounded in terms of a certain cognitive model 
accounting for a given aspect of the surrounding reality, operative either at the 
present  moment  or  –  more  frequently  –  at  the  time  when  the  change  was 
initiated. As Geeraerts and Grondelaers (1995) put it:  
 […] if cognitive models are cultural models, they are also cultural institutions, and as such, 
they  carry  their  history  along  with  them:  their  institutional  nature  implies  their  historical 
continuity. It is only by investigating their historical origins and their gradual transformation that 
their contemporary form can be properly understood.  
Nevertheless, our analyses of meaning change point to the fact that even 
though a given case of semantic development was conventionally considered 
as motivated linguistically, rather than extralinguistically, from the perspective 
of cognitive linguistic it may still be claimed that such semantic developments 
are  extralinguistically  motivated,  as  they  are  generated  not  by  some 
language-internal patterns of figurative speech, but by the language-external 
mechanisms of human condition grounded in human experience of the world.
80
A  secondary  conclusion  which  may  be  inferred  from  our  analyses  is 
79 This, as we argued earlier, was in fact generally abandoned by cognitive linguists who 
stigmatized the false dichotomies between linguistic and extralinguistic knowledge (cf. Langacker 
1987:154). 
80  For  further  details  see  the  forthcoming  PhD  dissertation  by  Cymbalista  (University  of 
Rzeszów). 83
convergent with the observation formulated by Radden and Panther (2004:31) 
to the effect that:  
A  full-fledged  theory  of  motivation  would,  of  course,  have  to  distinguish  many  more 
language-independent  factors  of  [...]  These  would,  amongst  others,  include  cultural,  social, 
psychological and anthropological factors as well as biological and neurological determinants, 
which, however, are not yet sufficiently known.  
However, it must be remembered that despite the universal application of 
the cognitive approach to modern academic and scientific research, biological 
and neurological studies definitely go beyond the scope of linguistics proper 
and, even more so, of this publication. 
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